As the role of US congressional parties in the legislative process has increased, so has the importance of understanding the institutions within these organizations. In this article, we examine the weekly caucus meetings held by Republican House leaders with their rank-and-file. We consider how members’ characteristics relate to their decision to attend based on the collective and private benefits that caucus participation affords. Using interviews of members and staffers as well as members’ attendance records at these meetings from 2007 to 2013, we find, among other things, that members who vote less with their party or who have more seniority are less likely to attend while those in leadership positions or who are electorally vulnerable are more likely to do so. Together, these findings provide additional insights on the relationship between party leaders and their members and which members benefit from this central party-building activity.

Legislative parties are part of the foundation of the modern US Congress and have taken an increasingly active role in both legislative and electoral politics over the last several decades. In this article, we examine an understudied institution that is central to contemporary parties’ management of their affairs—the weekly caucus meetings held by party leaders with the rank-and-file members. These meetings are the only venue where all members of the party meet, hear from the leadership, and discuss the issues facing the party. The caucus meetings allow for the exchange of information and help the party identify and implement its legislative agenda.

We focus on the decision of Republican House members to attend their party’s caucus meetings. These decisions are unusual in that they are out of the gaze of constituents and interest groups; attendance records...
are not public. While leaders may strategically allow members to vote against the party line on particular roll calls in order to please constituents, members’ decisions to attend do not directly affect their standing with electorally important groups outside of the party organization. Examining these meetings and who attends provides unique insights into whose interests are served by party-building activities and the relationship between party leaders and their members.

We consider members’ decision to participate as a function of collective and private benefits provided to members from attendance. Collective benefits include facilitating legislative strategy to build the party brand and to gain and maintain majority status. Among the private benefits are the acquisition of information from party leaders and colleagues and the opportunity to affect the party’s agenda and signal loyalty to party leaders. Based on these benefits, we consider how members’ characteristics—such as their leadership positions, seniority, and roll-call voting—are related to decisions to attend.

To test our hypotheses, we analyze original qualitative and quantitative evidence. The former consists of interviews conducted between 2013 and 2016 of five Republican House members, three chiefs of staff (in other members’ offices), and multiple staffers in the House Republican Party organization who have extensive experience with caucus meetings. These interviews provide important insights into members’ relationship with the party organization and their motivations for participating. They also clarify the costs, benefits, and determinants of attendance.

Our quantitative analyses are based on Republican members’ attendance records at caucus meetings from 2007 to 2013. To preview our results, we find that those who vote the least with their fellow Republicans in public are also less likely to caucus with them in private. In addition, we find that party leaders and those who are electorally vulnerable attend at higher rates, while more senior members and those who are leaving office (e.g., running for other offices or retiring) are less likely to show up. Consistent with our argument that the primary cost of attending is time, we find that the geographic distance between a member’s district and Washington, DC has a negative correlation with attendance. Together, the qualitative and quantitative analyses suggest that the private benefits of caucus attendance are an important driver of members’ participation.

Our analysis broadens our understanding of Congress by examining a legislative behavior other than roll-call votes. It also builds on a small but robust literature that analyzes an important institution within the party apparatus (e.g., Curry 2015; Forgets 2004; Rohde 1991).
Understanding behind-the-scenes party organization can elucidate broader puzzles in American politics such as the increase in polarization. For example, Lee argues that polarization is increased by “stronger, more effective partisan coordination” (2000, 73), something caucus meetings facilitate. Understanding participation also clarifies how well the party agenda represents its members overall.

An Overview of Republican Caucus Meetings

Although caucus meetings are a central component of contemporary legislative parties, they were not a regular feature in the prereform era apart from their extensive use by the Democratic Party in the 1910s (Jones 2000; Ripley 1967; Rohde 1991). Democratic House leaders and conservative committee chairs opposed efforts in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s to organize regular meetings of the membership for fear it could undermine their power (Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1995). However, the Democrats’ presidential election loss in 1980 and the realization that their party was “badly split on both policy and strategy” (Sinclair 1995, 107) pushed Democratic leaders to embrace the potential role of caucus meetings as a policy seminar and means of intraparty communication (105–15). In this way, the meetings became an extension of efforts in the late 1970s to use the whip system and ad hoc policy committees to “includ[e] as many members as possible in the coalition-building process” (Hammond and Smock 1998, 298). By the mid-1980s, the Democratic Party held caucus meetings regularly—about twice a month—to consider political and policy matters (Sinclair 1995).

Though much less is known about the Republicans’ history with caucus meetings prior to gaining majority control in the 1990s, the evidence suggests that regular meetings with the rank-and-file had become institutionalized prior to their takeover of the House. Forgette (2004) shows that by the early 1990s, both parties met as a caucus nearly every week that the House was in session. Caucus meetings also embodied Rep. Newt Gingrich’s professed leadership strategy to “listen, learn, help, lead” (Andres 1999; Peters 1997; Strahan 2007). Meetings provided both the opportunity for the Speaker to hear the concerns of his members and attempt to persuade them to adopt his vision for the party (Fenno 1997; Peters 1997; Strahan 2007). This is consistent with Gingrich’s explicit strategy leading up to the 1994 elections to “capture 70 to 80% of the incoming freshmen every two years” through organized efforts of persuasion and socialization (quoted in Fenno 1997, 35). Regular caucus meetings accomplish both of these efforts in service of “capturing” members to a particular cause. These meetings were also...
one of several key activities constituting “The ‘Buy-In’ Strategy” that Gingrich employed to allow members to provide input on the party’s agenda and thus feel more invested in it (Sinclair 1998).

Republican leaders, however, did not escape the pushback from the rank-and-file that caucus meetings can foster. Caucus meetings provided a forum through which members could push for legislation that leadership hoped to avoid such as “a gift ban, lobbying reform, and campaign finance” in the 104th Congress (Sinclair 1999, 28). The meetings could also be a source of resentment (while simultaneously providing a platform to express resentment) when leadership failed to respond to members’ concerns. As a member under Gingrich’s leadership noted: “It’s hard to convince people you’re listening if we all know you’ve already made up your mind” (Andres 1999, 572). The Republican leaders’ apparent naivété with regard to the potential for caucus meetings to undermine their agenda is consistent with Fenno’s (1997) claim that Republicans experienced setbacks as they had to learn to govern after 40 years in the minority.

Under Gingrich’s leadership, regular meetings became institutionalized within the Republican Party, and subsequent leaders would have to account for them in their management strategies. Speaker Hastert, Gingrich’s successor, recognized the importance of not just seeking members’ input in these meetings but also proactively adjusting the party’s legislative agenda accordingly, as was done with the FY2000 Budget Resolution (Andres 1999). Andres (1999) notes that many House Republicans wanted Hastert to replicate this approach with other major pieces of legislation, suggesting this was the exception and not the norm. Our interviews indicate that Speaker Boehner used a similar approach on occasion. In addition, he continued the practice of holding weekly caucus meetings as well as special meetings outside of the regular schedule to address major issues or legislation as needed.

The private nature of caucus meetings, while offering theoretical insight into the behavior of House members, also presents a practical limitation. On the Republican side, only members and party staffers are allowed to attend, a policy enacted by Speaker Gingrich in response to leaks. Despite this, journalists still sometimes report on the proceedings. Research on caucus meetings in the postreform era also relies heavily on elite interviews and journalists’ accounts to understand the role of the meetings. This includes accounts of the role played by caucus meetings as the Democratic Party enacted key institutional reforms in the House (Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1995) and an analysis of how party leaders’ use their control of information to influence legislative outcomes (Curry 2015).
Despite their importance to legislative parties, caucus meetings have rarely been examined quantitatively because of data limitations. One notable exception is Forgette (2004), who obtained individual attendance records of House Republicans from 1987 through 1998 and dates of both House parties’ caucus meetings from 1946 to 1999 for Republicans and from 1975 to 1999 for Democrats. Forgette focuses on when meetings are held and their effect on roll-call voting. He finds that both parties met more often as polarization in Congress increased, which is consistent with conditional party government and a view of parties as a mechanism for coordination (and not enforcement) on shared political goals (Calvert 1995, 2001). In addition, Republican members who attended a conference meeting in the 105th Congress (1997–98) were 11% more likely to vote the party position on key votes that occurred within three days of that meeting. Our analysis differs from Forgette in several ways. First, we focus on data from the contemporary House and on analyzing the member-level factors associated with attendance, something that Forgette only addresses briefly. Additionally, we complement the quantitative analysis with qualitative data from interviews of House members and staffers.

Logistics of Republican Caucus Meetings

To understand the role of caucus meetings in the contemporary House Republican Party, we conducted interviews with five Republican House members, three chiefs of staff (in other members’ offices), and multiple staffers in the House Republican Party. Information about the logistics of the meetings comes primarily from interviews of staffers conducted in the spring of 2013. Comments from the other interviewees confirmed these details. Though some of the logistics are specific to the meetings under Rep. McMorris Rodgers’s tenure as Conference Chair, the basic format of these meetings has been consistent during the entire time period of our analysis (2007 through 2013).

Conference meetings are closed-door affairs. Technically, only Republican representatives and a few senior staff members from key committees and the leadership’s offices are allowed to attend, though there have been times when this rule was not rigorously enforced, so some members’ chiefs of staff have attended. The regular conference meeting is held the morning after the House comes into session for more than two consecutive days. Since the leadership wants all members to attend, no other House or party events are scheduled at those times. In recent years, the location of the meeting has varied between three regular meeting places. This includes the so-called political meetings held about
once a month at the offices of the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), the campaign arm of the House Republican Party. At these meetings, leaders address campaign-related issues in addition to the regular agenda items.⁵ In addition to the regularly scheduled Conference meetings, the party leadership may also call additional meetings in preparation for important, time-sensitive matters.⁶

Members are primarily informed about the meetings (or reminded in the case of regularly scheduled ones) through one or two e-mails sent from a Conference staffer prior to the meeting. These e-mails usually only provide information about the time and location of the meetings. In the case of meetings held outside of the normal time, the e-mail will sometimes include the topic to be discussed though without any further details.⁷ The few times a year when a special guest speaker is invited to address the Conference, such as former Speaker Newt Gingrich, the e-mail invitation will also mention the guest’s name.⁸ Overall, the information provided in the invites is minimal.

Typical Conference meetings follow a standard agenda. Beginning at 8:45 a.m., a continental breakfast is provided, allowing members to socialize. The meeting officially begins at 9:05 a.m. with a prayer and the pledge of allegiance, followed by 5 to 10 minutes of announcements from the Conference, which include highlights from the past week, a spotlight of a freshman member, and sometimes a video on best practices highlighting a member’s work with constituents.⁹

The majority of the meeting time consists of the leadership reports in which each party leader¹⁰ provides 5 to 10 minutes of remarks. First, the Speaker presents an overview of the party’s agenda for the upcoming week. He is followed by the Majority Leader who provides details on the legislative schedule, identifying the votes where the leadership especially wants members to vote together. The whip then reviews the specific votes that will be whipped and how the whipping will occur. Finally, the Conference Chair presents the messaging that the party wants members to use in their public communications about that week’s agenda. At the monthly “political meeting” held at the NRCC office, the NRCC Chair also addresses the audience for 5 to 10 minutes to discuss elections and campaign fundraising. After the leadership reports, committee chairs address the audience to discuss matters under their stewardship, such as legislation and committee hearings and investigations, that are relevant to the entire caucus. A common element in these presentations is persuasion—the leadership is not only reporting on the party’s legislative agenda but also attempting to persuade the rank-and-file to vote with that agenda and use the party’s messaging.
The flow of information is not one-directional. Members in attendance audibly react to the leaders’ presentations, whether in support or opposition to them. The meetings also provide a formal means for members to share their opinions with colleagues by ending with an open microphone question-and-answer (Q&A) session, in which each member has up to one minute to address his or her colleagues and the party leadership on any topics the member chooses. Members often use this time to address issues discussed in the meeting, ask questions of the party leadership or other presenters, or even criticize them. Some members promote an issue they are passionate about to their colleagues. The Q&A time has been a feature of the Republican Conference meetings since at least 2000. Some suggested that leadership uses it to allow members to “blow off steam” (interview #2). This feature of caucus meetings is consistent with party-management strategies developed under Speaker Gingrich, as discussed above. Although we do not have systematic data on who addresses the Conference during Q&A, our interviews suggest that at a typical meeting, 5 to 10 members take advantage of the Q&A. Several referred to a few “open mic regulars” who use the Q&A time so often that “people roll their eyes” (interview #1). At Conference meetings addressing salient or divisive issues, Q&A sessions may last 30 minutes to an hour instead of the normal 5 to 10 minutes (interviews #1, #9, and #12), as more members are eager to express their opinion.

The regular Conference meetings last 45 to 60 minutes while special Conference meetings can last several hours. Although the four top party leaders stay through the entire meeting, members come and go. Interviewees noted that members left the meeting in three waves of about equal size. The first wave leaves after the whip’s remarks and prior to the Conference Chair’s review of party messaging. Party staffs (interviews #9 and #12) speculated, to their chagrin, that these members believed they did not need “hand-holding” on how to publicly discuss the party’s agenda. The second wave leaves just prior to Q&A, with the final wave staying until the end of the meeting.

**The Private and Collective Benefits of Caucus Attendance**

Caucus meetings may provide both collective and private benefits to members who participate. Among direct private benefits, information acquisition is critical to members’ decisionmaking on voting and how to explain those votes to their constituents (Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989), activities that directly impact members’ re-election goals. Members rely on shortcuts to make decisions on roll-call voting from party leaders,
committee chairs, and, especially, more knowledgeable colleagues who share their policy preferences or electoral environment (Kingdon 1989).

The primary source of information at the meetings is from the leadership on their plans for and justifications of the party’s legislative agenda and advice on how to communicate the agenda to the public. Though there may seem to be less costly means to obtain cues from the party leadership, such as the extensive whip organization and other communications from the party leadership (Carson, Crespin, and Madonna 2012), leadership staff commented that party leaders purposely limit the amount of information conveyed through e-mails and other recorded formats to minimize leaks (interview #10), making caucus attendance valuable for those who seek information from party leaders. Caucus attendance also facilitates information acquisition from other rank-and-file members. As one of the few forums in which all members can come and openly voice their opinions on the party’s legislative agenda, those in attendance can learn the legislative priorities and preferences of the body as a whole. This can help members assess the party’s agenda and whether their vote is pivotal to its success. Members may also look to particular members who are opinion leaders in forming their opinion on legislative items (Kingdon 1989).

A second private benefit is information provision—the meetings provide a forum for members to persuade their colleagues and the party leadership to support their position or at least use negative agenda control to stop bills that would be detrimental to their interests. Though e-mails and “dear colleague” letters provide other means for information provision, recorded formats may discourage open deliberation, and they do not allow the sender to know if others received the information or were persuaded by it.

Third, caucus attendance solves the coordination problem of meeting with colleagues to discuss shared interests. Members rarely see their colleagues who are not on their committees nor members of other active member organizations. The Republican caucus meetings provide a regular gathering place where members know they can likely find colleagues with whom they need to speak.

Finally, participation at the meetings may also be a means for members to curry favor with party leaders by signaling their commitment to the party. Since Conference staff tracks individual members’ attendance, leadership can easily monitor participation in this party-building activity.

Caucus participation can also contribute to collective benefits, the most important of which is the party’s brand and its ability to gain or maintain majority status. The meetings contribute to these goals by
influencing the party’s legislative agenda. As Lee notes: “Party institutions are not important merely as mechanisms to enforce party discipline or to select leaders who monopolize gate-keeping positions. . . . They are also important as a means of sharing information and facilitating negotiation among fellow partisans” (2009, 180). Forgette adds that “[t]he role of party leaders with the party caucus . . . is to signal to the party rank-and-file a particular party position that lies within the caucus majority’s pareto set. Rather than enforcing compliance in a prisoners’ dilemma, party leaders solve a coordination problem of multiple, asymmetric equilibria among copartisans” (2004, 410). Thus, caucus meetings help the party identify an optimal legislative agenda, which strengthens its brand and its ability to gain and maintain majority status (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007).

Though party leaders use and would probably prefer other means to gauge members’ interests in order to identify a feasible legislative strategy, caucus meetings provide a richer information environment for the rank-and-file. For example, the Republican Party employs a large whipping organization 13 that allows the leadership to survey members’ preferences and attempt to influence them. However, whip counts do not inform the rank-and-file about the legislative preferences of their colleagues, which likely affects how they vote, as discussed above. The caucus meeting is one of the few venues that provides this information, bolstering the party’s ability to identify a legislative agenda that can maintain the coalition’s support on the floor.

In considering the benefits of caucus attendance, it is important to recognize that the party’s brand and majority status are public goods (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007), which means members face incentives to shirk in contributing to them since they receive the benefits regardless of their individual efforts. However, members may still have incentives to participate due to the private benefits listed above and because party leadership could use selective incentives to encourage participation. In addition, members may feel social pressure to adhere to a norm of participation. And finally, given the relatively small size of legislative parties, members may believe that the impact of their participation on these collective goods outweighs the costs of that participation (Lee 2009), especially since majority status (Lee 2009, 13) and the party brand also confer a host of private benefits (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007).

In addition to providing benefits, attendance may incur costs as well. Unlike roll-call votes, House members’ decision to attend caucus meetings is private. Only their fellow party members know the extent of their participation. Thus, members are not directly rewarded or punished
by voters and interest groups for their participation. As such, the largest cost is likely time. Members of Congress “face ... too many decisions and too little time in which to make them” (Kingdon 1989, 228). Consequently, they “avoid time-consuming information searches unless they feel that they need the information because of a decisional problem that is presented to them” (228). Though caucus meetings serve as an informational shortcut, some of this information may be available through other means, as discussed above, making a one-hour meeting costly.

Which Members Are More Likely to Attend?

Given the costs and benefits of participating in caucus meetings, which Republican House members will be likely to attend? To answer this question, we consider several member characteristics that may be associated with attendance. We begin with the role of ideology given its importance in theories of legislative party organizations. Based on the costs and benefits outlined above, the relationship between members’ ideology and caucus meeting attendance may take several forms.

One hypothesis is that members with preferences similar to the party leadership or median member will more highly value the benefits of participation and attend at higher rates than others. This could be driven by private goods, such as information from leadership. The messaging on the agenda would better reflect their preferences and the image they are attempting to create for themselves for electoral purposes (Curry 2015, 75–77). They are also more likely to trust the information provided by those who share their underlying preferences. Members who do not share the leadership’s preferences are aware that party leaders use information to shape outcomes in the leaders’ favor (75–77) and, thus, would be wary of that information nor find it as useful (75–77). They may even find the attempts at persuasion demeaning and condescending. As Curry finds in his interviews of rank-and-file members in both parties, some members “often described ... information [from party leaders] as inadequate, misleading, or biased” with “such a partisan slant that it was probably helpful only to the most partisan lawmakers” (75). Though members have limited knowledge about what will be discussed in upcoming caucus meetings, they still have a sense of upcoming legislation and may avoid specific meetings depending on what will likely be discussed.

This relationship between members’ attendance and preferences may also arise because their policy preferences, especially over specific roll calls (Behringer, Evans, and Materese 2006), are not fixed (Evans and Oleszek 1999; Lee 2009). If members attend caucus meetings to
gain information, then those who attend may be more likely to share their party’s preferences because they adjusted their preferences in response to the information provided at the meetings.

Finally, the collective goods from caucus attendance may not be valued by all members equally. For example, Cox and McCubbins argue that the majority’s veto can cause “centrist members [to] suffer a net policy loss” (2007, 46). If the party’s legislative agenda and the resulting party brand are a function of the preferences of the majority within the party, those in the minority may not find as much value in contributing to these goods.

It is also possible that no relationship exists between ideology and attendance. If attendance primarily provided collective goods that benefited members equally regardless of their policy preferences and contributions to these goods, then ideology would not predict members’ attendance. Since attendance is private, members would not upset any electorally important groups for meeting regularly with party leadership to contribute to these collective goods. Though it is unlikely that the party brand benefits members equally, policy losers may be compensated through other benefits, such as committee positions and campaign funding (Cox and McCubbins 2007; Jenkins and Monroe 2012, 46).

Even if attendance were motivated by private benefits, these benefits may be equally valued across the ideological spectrum. Those who disagree with the leadership may still attend to monitor the leadership to be prepared for upcoming votes that counter their preferences or to thwart the leadership’s plans through information provision. Policy losers may also attend to ensure that their preferences are registered by party leaders as they attempt to identify the pareto set of policies for the party’s agenda.

Finally, the relationship between attendance and ideology may be asymmetrical. Given that members closer to the ideological center of the entire chamber are predicted to be policy losers under the cartel model (Cox and McCubbins 2007) and that members on the extremes of either party are more responsive to calls to support the party’s legislative agenda (Minozzi and Volden 2013), we might expect Republicans who are to the left of their party’s center to perceive the benefits of attendance differently than those on the opposite side and, as a result, attend at different rates. For reasons explained above, these more moderate Republicans may attend at either lower rates (due to finding less value in the information provided) or, possibly, higher rates (to keep tabs on the party’s agenda or try to persuade the party to their position) than the rest of their colleagues. At the same time, many of the Republicans who publicly opposed their party’s legislative strategies under Speaker Boehner
were from the conservative side of the party and not the moderate one, which could suggest that they find less value from the meetings than the rest of the party.

We consider both ideological distance from the median party member as well as from party leaders. If party-building activities are majoritarian, serving the interests of the majority of the majority, we would anticipate based on the median voter theorem that differences in attendance would be a function of their distance from the median Republican. However, as pointed out, party leaders are not powerless and run the meetings. To the extent that leaders’ preferences differ from the median Republican’s, it is likely that the benefits of attendance are greatest for those who share their leaders’ preferences.

In evaluating the relationship between attendance and ideology, we must account for the fact that measures of members’ policy preferences are often based on roll-call votes (e.g., DW-NOMINATE scores or interest group ratings). In these cases, we are testing whether members’ public roll-call behavior correlates with their private attendance behavior. Since roll-call votes are easily monitored, members face different electoral pressures on how to cast their votes (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001). Roll-call behavior may not be a reflection of their ideology or support for the party’s agenda. It may be in the party’s interest to allow members to vote differently from the party on roll calls where their votes are not needed and those members face electoral incentives to vote against the majority of the party (Clark 2012). To the extent this occurs, it diminishes the likelihood of a relationship between members’ roll-call votes and caucus attendance. At the same time, those who vote in line with the party (if only for strategic purposes and not sincere ideological views) may still find the information from leadership more helpful for their re-election goals since roll calls are part of their personal brand.

Turning to other member characteristics, we hypothesize that committee chairs and elected party leaders will be more likely to attend than the rank-and-file because they are likely to be highly committed to the party and to maintaining their leadership positions. Occasionally, committee chairs make presentations at the meetings, which would also increase their attendance. Those holding positions in the party organization will likely have even higher attendance since they regularly make presentations to the caucus. In addition, acquiring information on the preferences of the rank-and-file is important to maintain their elected party position, manage the party, and craft its legislative agenda. Party leaders are also more likely to internalize the collective benefits provided by caucus meetings.
We also hypothesize that a longer tenure in office will be associated with lower attendance. These members have greater expertise on any number of legislative issues and their own track record with which to inform their vote (Arnold 1990; Kingdon 1989) and thus are not as in need for information. They can also rely more on their personal reputations and less on the party brand in pursuing re-election, diminishing the value of the collective goods from attendance.

A member’s electoral vulnerability may also influence attendance. Electorally vulnerable members may be more reliant on the campaign resources of the party and, thus, feel pressure to signal loyalty. Members who are electorally safe may be less concerned about the party’s brand as it is less likely to affect their re-election chances. Electorally vulnerable members have a greater incentive to make sure their preferences are represented in the party’s legislative agenda and to learn how to present that agenda to electorally important constituents. On the other hand, electorally vulnerable members may face higher costs in attending due to the need to spend more time on re-election activities in their district.

Among the costs of attendance, time is among the most significant. While the length of the meetings does not vary by member, the potential cost of the time may. We use the distance from each member’s home district to Washington, DC as a proxy for this variable. Given the logistics and additional time it takes to travel to a distant district, we expect that members’ attendance will decline as their district’s distance to Washington, DC increases.

Evidence from Interviews

To analyze these theoretical expectations and the role of caucus meetings in the House Republican Party, we return to the qualitative data from our interviews of five Republican House members (interviews #1–5), three chiefs of staff from other offices (interviews #6–8), multiple staffers in the Republican House party leadership (interview #9–11), and a senior committee staffer (interview #12). In the online supporting information, we provide more information about the nature of these interviews, which were conducted between 2013 and 2016, and summary characteristics of those interviewed. In sum, these members and chiefs of staff represent multiple regions in the country and vary in their leadership roles, seniority, attendance rates, and roll-call behavior. Given the small sample size, we do not claim that their views on the roles of these meetings are representative of their party. Nonetheless, the interviews provide insight into the nature of the meetings and additional support for our theoretical expectations.
For party staffers, organizing the meetings is a core responsibility, and one of their goals is to maximize attendance. As one staffer noted: “One of the most important things we do every week is put on the Conference meeting. It’s like producing a weekly TV show. Our problem is our show is losing viewers. That’s a big concern. In network TV they cancel shows where viewership declines. We don’t want that to happen to us” (interview #9). When asked about the benefits of the meeting, party staffers (interviews #9 and 10) mentioned that it provided a forum to exchange information, to persuade members to vote the party line, and to coordinate communications strategy. This last goal was of particular concern to them.

Turning to the members and chiefs of staff, a need for information from both the party leadership and their colleagues underlies their stated motivations for participating in caucuses. This is apparent in Table 1, which displays our coding of members’ responses when asked why they attended and how important the meetings were to them. As one member noted: “You want to hear from the leaders and speaker personally, and not just from some news outlet. That’s the most valuable part about it” (interview #1). The main purpose is “[t]o keep everyone informed . . . The main benefit is to stay up with what’s current, what’s happening. Know what the votes are that are coming up” (interview #3). A chief of staff commented that “[m]y boss attends every week because he gets to hear directly from leadership. With social media and the 24-hour news cycle, information moves quickly but not all of it is accurate” (interview #6). Three of the members (interviews #3, 4, and 5) specifically mentioned the frustration of not having sufficient information about legislation prior to floor votes. According to interview #3, the party leaders under Boehner “purposely hold the information and bottle it up.” He felt this was effective because “[t]here is no way you could validate everything in a several thousand page bill when it’s released just a few days before a vote. It’s impossible.”

Although most of the information exchange in the meeting, at least formally, flows from the leadership to the rank-and-file, nearly every member and chief of staff stated that a main benefit and motivation for attending was to hear from their colleagues, and half stated that the meetings were more important to them when there were opportunities to discuss the issues as a party. When asked, all of the members, chiefs of staff, and party leadership staff believed that members’ participation affected the party’s legislative agenda. Interview #1 summarized how this plays out the best and covers nearly every aspect of the information exchange that other interviewees also mentioned:
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Attending</th>
<th>Interview Number</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Acquisition from Party Leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learn the general schedule, which votes are coming up</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learn reasoning behind party’s agenda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Receive information from leaders in person</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Acquisition from Colleagues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hear what issues members and groups are raising</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Information Provision</td>
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<td>Help shape the legislative agenda</td>
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<td>Working with Colleagues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understand the people I work with</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meet with other members to discuss shared interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Importance of Meeting to Member</td>
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<td>In General</td>
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<td>“They’re vital”</td>
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<tr>
<td>“I attended faithfully”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberation/Information Exchange</td>
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<td>More important when there’s debate or discussion</td>
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<td>. . . and rank-and-file help shape legislative agenda</td>
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<td>Frustrating when there isn’t debate or discussion</td>
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<td>Messaging</td>
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<td>General Information Acquisition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining info from party and committees through other means is difficult, so attending caucus is important</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More important if member’s unsure how to vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can’t get information elsewhere, including whip or email</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Coded responses from members and chiefs of staff when asked about the reasons they or their member attended and the importance of the meetings to the member. An underlined “X” indicates if a respondent explicitly stated a reason was the most important.
They’re the one time we’re able to get together and get a real sense of the disposition of the body. I’ve seen the Speaker present something that goes over like a lead balloon, and it’s a flop, and he knows it. Other times it’s the opposite. It can really sway the mood of the Conference in a big way. It’s an opportunity for leadership to rally the troops in the right direction. It’s a cantankerous group. Sometimes it’s like a melodrama where people are like “yeah” or “boo.” Members are not bashful about letting their views be heard. And to [the leadership’s] credit, they let people address them and the Conference. At the end of the meeting they have open-mic time, ... It’s a good time for people to say “Speaker, I’m against you” or “Majority Leader Cantor, I’m 100% with you.” Sometimes we really hammer out an issue. It can go on for hours.

The leadership staff (interviews #9, 10, and 12) described the Conference meetings as more egalitarian than the members did. A senior leadership staffer (interview #11) described it as a “small ‘d’ democracy environment” where the party “examines ideas as a community. ... [They] feel very much to me like a shareholder meeting. The stakeholder members are close and talking about the future of the organization.” As observers, they may be less sensitive to the power dynamic between the leadership and rank-and-file that underlies their interactions in the meetings.

One of the more conservative members (interview #3) expressed frustration with how the party leadership under Speaker Boehner used the Conference meetings to push their agenda saying (in quotes from several different points in the interview): “It’s frustrating, and kind of demeaning . . . just a means for leadership to jam things down our throats . . . We felt like pawns . . . Generally speaking, they were a propaganda session to sell whatever they were peddling that day.” In addition, he felt that the Q&A time was not sufficient for facilitating discussion. As he explained: “That’s not enough. When you’re looking at a several thousand page budget, what you can say in one minute is superficial.” Consistent with our theoretical expectations, this member also had the lowest attendance rate of those we interviewed. At the same time, he still found the meetings valuable “when policy is debated and the rank-and-file members are part of shaping the legislative agenda” or, in the words of another conservative member (interview #7), “[i]f there’s really an opportunity for give and take and sharing ideas.” Interviewee #3 felt that this opportunity for give and take occurred much less often than desired under Boehner, though it had improved under Rep. Paul Ryan. This lines up with insights of the senior staffer in the Majority Leader’s office (interview #11) who thought that Boehner’s leadership style was a “transition” between Hastert, who was much more top-down, and Ryan, who is more egalitarian.
Party leaders also seem to believe that members’ participation can affect the body’s position on issues since they “will specifically make requests of certain members (thought leaders and allies of the leadership) to make a point of getting up and expressing their opinion so the rank-and-file don’t only hear from the outliers” (interview #12). This senior committee staffer suggested that this skewed feedback is less of a concern on the most important issues, which are often discussed in special Conference meetings where attendance and participation in the Q&A are higher.

We asked two members and a chief of staff whether attending the meetings had ever changed their position on an issue. All three said that it had. One (interview #1) mentioned a specific example of the leadership making a persuasive argument that their position was better for the country and party. But, he made clear that he never felt pressured to vote one way or another. He said, “[i]t’s not beating us on the head. It’s making sure there are no surprises” before bringing legislation to the floor. A more conservative member guessed that the discussions had moved his position “maybe 10%” of the time. When asked if it was because of information provided from leadership or from colleagues, he responded, “I’m a member of the Freedom Caucus, and I care more about what their opinions are than what comes down from the Conference meetings” (interview #3). Finally, a chief of staff believed that her member usually had figured out his vote before the meetings. She said: “My member typically has already read the legislation before attending the meetings. Therefore, she has already deliberated and studied the issues. On occasion, if she has not yet arrived at a final decision, the debate can move her one way or another” (interview #7).

Views on the ways participation in Conference meetings can influence legislative positions highlights the risk to the leadership’s legislative agenda. The meetings provide an opportunity for leadership to persuade the rank-and-file, and they also allow for factions within the party to persuade others to their side. These findings inform why party leaders opposed early attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to institutionalize regular meetings of party members (Rohde 1991).

One final motivation for attending the meetings, as mentioned by two members (interviews #2 and 4), was the opportunity to meet with colleagues to work on legislation and other projects. The member noted, “I attended faithfully because that’s where you got to know what the agenda for the legislative week will be. But it’s also how members talk to each other. You don’t call each other. You always meet on the floor or in the conference” (interview #4).
When asked why they sometimes miss meetings, the most common answer was a lack of time. A more conservative member also mentioned that he avoids the meetings at the NRCC where “they just beat up on you for not paying NRCC dues, and I find those worthless” (interview #3).

Although our interviewees constitute a small sample of Republican members, nearly all of the responses focus on the private benefits of attendance. Comments about the importance of debate at these meetings may be motivated by creating a better party brand, but members rarely mentioned collective benefits explicitly. We asked four interviewees how important the meetings were to the success of the party and what benefits the party derived from them. Two mentioned how it helped the leadership set the agenda by hearing from the rank-and-file, but none tied this back explicitly to the party’s ability to build its reputation or gain and maintain majority status.

Only one member mentioned messaging when describing the purpose, benefits, or importance of the meetings (interview #6). We asked one member if leadership attempted to persuade members’ behavior on activities besides roll-call votes in the meetings. The member commented: “There’s communications. But the meeting is really about actions of the Conference” (interview #1). And by that, he meant votes, hearings, and investigations.

The interviews suggest that members have multiple motivations for participating, and they are often of a private nature. Members want to hear from both the leadership and their colleagues. They also believe leadership should adjust the party’s agenda in line with those opinions. Moreover, the evidence, though anecdotal, is consistent with the hypothesis that those who are ideologically distant are more likely to be frustrated with the information provided by leadership even though they still find value in the collective deliberations at the meetings, when they occur.

Evidence from Attendance Records

We now turn to an analysis of Republican House members’ attendance records at caucus meetings from the first session of the 110th Congress (2007), both sessions of the 111th and 112th Congresses (2009–2012), and the first five months of the 113th (January–May 2013). We obtained these confidential records directly from the House Republican Conference. Figure 1 provides an overview of attendance in the 110th through 113th Congresses. These histograms present the distribution of attendance for each member in each Congress. The
median attendance rate is 71%, 74%, 77%, and 64% for the 110th through 113th Congresses respectively. Mean rates of attendance are lower but follow a similar pattern—61%, 65%, 68%, and 59%, respectively. This increase in attendance rates through the 112th as the parties become more polarized is consistent with the rising trend observed by Forgette, who noted that “average attendance ... was about 45 percent during the 100th Congress; it increased to 60 percent by the 105th” (2004, 415). However, this does not explain the sudden drop in attendance in the beginning of the 113th, a pattern that holds even if we examine average attendance rates in the first five months of each Congress. Though median attendance is relatively high, there is still roughly a quarter of members in each Congress whose attendance is below 50%.

To analyze the factors associated with attendance at the Conference meetings, we estimate several multivariate regression models where the dependent variable is the percent of Conference meetings that
a member attended each Congress.\textsuperscript{23} We analyze members’ attendance rates per Congress since all of the independent variables of interest (i.e., ideological scores, election returns, committee assignments, etc.) are constant within each Congress.\textsuperscript{24} The attendance rate is calculated as the percent of meetings a member attended during a Congress while still in office. This includes members who were in office for a short time period. In the analysis, we test whether excluding members who do not serve a full term affects the results.

Our first set of independent variables deals with members’ ideology and partisan loyalty as measured by their roll-call votes.\textsuperscript{25} These analyses allow us to examine whether those who vote more in line with the party in public are also more likely to attend caucus meetings in private. In the analysis, we use two measures of members’ roll-call behavior. The first is first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores (Carroll et al. 2009), which provide ideal-point estimates of members’ revealed preferences relative to other members based on their roll-call votes.\textsuperscript{26} Our hypotheses on members’ policy preferences concern whether members who are to the left or right of the party leadership or median member attend at different rates. To examine this, we run regressions with both a quadratic and cubic form of members’ DW-NOMINATE score. This approach avoids making assumptions about where attendance peaks vis-à-vis members’ DW-NOMINATE score, and the cubic model allows for asymmetry in the attendance rates of those on either side of that peak.

Our second measure of members’ policy preferences is members’ party-unity score (e.g., Koger and Lebo 2012), which is the proportion of party votes in a Congress in which the member votes with the majority of her party. “Party votes” are roll calls in which the majority of Republicans vote opposite to the majority of Democrats. Though party-unity scores are used as a measure of general loyalty to one’s party that is conceptually distinct from members’ DW-NOMINATE score, these variables are highly correlated. A regression of members’ party-unity scores on their DW-NOMINATE scores and the square of their DW-NOMINATE scores has an R-squared of 0.52. Since including both measures in the same regression introduces problems associated with multicollinearity, we present models that include these variables separately and together.

To account for the relationship between members’ attendance and their position in the party hierarchy, we include an indicator for whether a member is a party leader in the current Congress, which we designate as either the Speaker, Majority/Minority Leader, Whip, Deputy Whip, Conference Chair, Conference Vice Chair, Conference Secretary, Policy
Committee Chair, or National Republican Congressional Committee Chair. We also include an indicator for whether a member is a chair or ranking minority member of a committee during the current Congress. We measure seniority as the number of years that a member has served in the House including the first year of the current Congress. To test whether members with busier schedules are less likely to attend, we include the logged number of miles between the geographic center of a member’s district and Washington, DC.

We also account for members’ electoral vulnerability. We create an indicator that equals 1 if a member won his or her general or primary election by 5 points or less or if the member represented a district that voted for the most recent Democratic presidential candidate at a higher rate than the national average.

We include several control variables in the model to account for special circumstances that likely have a negative impact on members’ attendance and may correlate with other independent variables of interest. The first is members who have planned resignations from Congress during a session. Five members in our sample meet this requirement—three resigned to pursue higher office, one resigned to take a position as a lobbyist, and one retired. We expect that members who plan to resign from office during a session will have few incentives to continue attending Conference meetings once they have made that decision. We also account for one member who was undergoing intensive cancer treatment before passing away while still in office. To account for these situations, we include an indicator (Left Congress) for whether the member left Congress for the reasons described above. We also include an indicator variable to account for members who plan to leave their office at the end of the session and announce those plans while in office (Plans to Leave Congress). Finally, we also account for members who ran for another office at some point during each Congress (Running for Other Office). Such members likely face higher logistical costs to attend and, like those who no longer plan to stay in office, find less value in collective party-building activities.

Results

To examine the factors associated with attendance, we first regress members’ average attendance rate in each Congress on the independent variables discussed in the previous section. We also include indicator variables for the 111th, 112th, and 113th Congress. Since members who served in multiple Congresses during this time period appear multiple times in the data set, we use robust standard
errors, clustered at the member level, to account for potential correlation between the error terms.\textsuperscript{30} The results from this regression analysis are displayed in Table 2.

We test several model specifications in columns (1) through (7) to adjudicate between the several possible relationships between members’ roll-call voting and their attendance as well as to address multicollinearity between DW-NOMINATE and party-unity scores. Throughout our model specifications, the primary finding concerning these variables is that those who vote less in line with their Republican colleagues are also less likely to attend caucus meetings, even while controlling for a host of other variables associated with attendance.

In columns (1) and (2), we use a quadratic function of members’ DW-NOMINATE score to examine how members’ roll-call behavior correlates with their caucus attendance. The difference between these models is that controls are included in column (2), which diminishes the effects somewhat. In column (3), we loosen the constraints on the form of the relationship between attendance and roll-call voting by including a cubic function of members’ DW-NOMINATE score. To help interpret the DW-NOMINATE coefficients in these models, we plot how members’ predicted attendance rate varies with their DW-NOMINATE score in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 based on the regression results in columns (2) and (3), respectively.

Several patterns are apparent in these plots. First, the relationship between DW-NOMINATE scores and attendance are quite similar whether a quadratic (panel [a]) or cubic function (panel [b]) is used. Second, members’ attendance and DW-NOMINATE scores have an inverted-u relationship—those with lower and higher DW-NOMINATE scores attend at lower rates even when controlling for a host of other variables associated with attendance. Third, the relationship between attendance and DW-NOMINATE scores is quite symmetrical but not around the DW-NOMINATE score of the median Republican House member, which equals 0.675 (and is indicated by the black vertical line in panels [a] and [b]). Rather, members with DW-NOMINATE scores just above the median attend at the highest rates. By taking the derivative of the coefficients on the DW-NOMINATE variables, we find that the peak (as indicated by the dashed vertical line in each panel) is located at a DW-NOMINATE score of 0.731 in column (2)\textsuperscript{31} and 0.751 in column (3). Though we cannot isolate the reason why peak attendance is just to the right of the median Republican’s, one possibility is that it is closer to the leadership’s ideal points given their influence on the the meetings’ agenda and value to the rank-and-file. Though the median (0.669) and mean...
### TABLE 2
A Model of House Republicans’ Caucus Meeting Attendance

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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*Note: Results are from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is a member’s average caucus attendance rate each Congress, including the first session of the 110th Congress, both sessions of the 111th and 112th Congresses, and the first five months of the 113th Congress. Robust standard errors, clustered by member, are in brackets. *p < 0.05, two-tailed.
FIGURE 2
Predicted Attendance Rates by DW-NOMINATE Score and Party Unity

(a) Model 2: Quadratic Function of DW-NOMINATE Score
(b) Model 3: Cubic Function of DW-NOMINATE Score
(c) Model 4: Distance from Rep. Boehner’s DW-NOMINATE Score
(d) Model 6: Party Unity Score

Note: Panels (a) through (d) illustrate predicted attendance rates based on models (2), (3), (4), and (6), respectively, from Table 2. The gray bars are a histogram of the variable on the x-axis with the right y-axis indicating the percent of observations in each bin. The vertical black lines indicate the median value on the x-axis while vertical dashed lines indicate the DW-NOMINATE score where attendance peaks in panels (a) and (b). Predicted attendance rates (black curves) are calculated by holding all other continuous variables at their means while setting all indicator variables, save for 112th Congress, to zero. Dashed curves are 95% confidence intervals.

(0.691) DW-NOMINATE scores for the party leadership as a whole are much closer to the median Republican’s, the peak is very close to Rep. John Boehner’s, who was the Republican’s top official at this time and had an average DW-NOMINATE score of 0.728.32
Substantively, the results show that DW-NOMINATE scores are not a strong predictor of attendance except among those who are furthest from Rep. Boehner and the majority of Republican House members. Based on the estimates in column (2) of Table 2 and panel (a) of Figure 2, a Republican member who is the median distance below Rep. Boehner’s DW-NOMINATE score, which would be a DW-NOMINATE score of 0.605, has an attendance rate that is 2 percentage points lower than a member who votes similarly to Rep. Boehner. This is equal to about one less meeting a year based on members attending on average about 30 of the 48 meetings held each year during this time period. For members further out, the difference in attendance rates grows substantially. Those at the 90th percentile in terms of distance from Rep. Boehner, which would be scores of 0.456 or 1.0, are predicted to have an attendance rate that is about 8 percentage points lower, which equals about four (or 13%) fewer meetings a year.

In column (4) of Table 2 and panel (c) of Figure 2, we find that the relationship between members’ DW-NOMINATE scores and their attendance holds when we use the absolute distance between members’ DW-NOMINATE score and Rep. John Boehner’s average score across the three Congresses as the independent variable. Substantively, the results are similar though larger than those from column (2). Those at the median distance are predicted to have an attendance rate that is 5 percentage points lower while those at the 90th percentile are predicted to have one 12 percentage points lower.

The relationship between members’ roll-call voting and caucus attendance is similar when examining the coefficients on members’ party-unity scores (columns [5] and [6] of Table 2). As illustrated in panel (d) of Figure 2, those who vote more often with the party on party-line votes also attend caucus meetings at higher rates. Based on the results in column (6), moving from the first quartile of party unity (91%) to the third quartile (97%) yields a predicted increase in attendance of 6 percentage points or about three extra meetings a year. At the extreme, comparing those in the 10th percentile (Party Unity = 0.83) to those in the 90th percentile (Party Unity = 0.98) results in a 12 percentage point difference in attendance rates.

Finally, in column (7), we include both the quadratic function of members’ DW-NOMINATE score and their party-unity scores to examine whether multicollinearity affects the coefficients on these variables. Not surprisingly, the coefficients on the DW-NOMINATE variables are reduced by about 40% and 35% while the coefficient on Party Unity is about 20% smaller. Taken together, a member who has a much lower DW-NOMINATE score than Rep. Boehner’s
(90th percentile at 0.456) and whose party-unity score is quite low (10th percentile at 83%) is predicted to have an attendance rate that is 13 percentage points (or 20%) lower than someone with the same DW-NOMINATE score as Rep. Boehner and a party-unity score at the 90th percentile (98%).

Moving to the other independent variables, we find consistent evidence across all five models for our hypotheses concerning which members would be more likely to attend caucus meetings. As expected, members in elected party-leadership positions attend at higher rates—about 22 to 23 percentage points higher—than the rest of the Conference. Similarly, the attendance rate of members who are committee chairs is between 17 and 18 percentage points higher, reflecting an additional seven meetings per year. Comparing these coefficients to the ones on members’ voting behavior is somewhat complicated since this latter variable is continuous while the other two are binary. Nonetheless, we can arguably use the difference for members at the 90th percentile in terms of DW-NOMINATE distance as a baseline comparison given that just 4% of members in our sample hold leadership positions and 10% are committee chairs. Based on the column (7) results discussed in the previous paragraph, the coefficient on being a party leader is about 73% larger while that on being a committee chair is about 35% larger.

More senior members also attend at lower rates. With a coefficient of $-1$, a member at the 75th percentile (with 15 years in office) attends at a rate that is 12 percentage points lower than someone at the 25th percentile (with three years in office). Those who are electorally vulnerable are also more likely to attend at rates that are between 6 and 9 percentage points higher than those from safer districts. Finally, we find that members who live furthest from Washington, DC are also less likely to attend. Based on the results in column (7), a member whose district is at the median (742 miles away from the capital) is predicted to have an attendance rate that is 12 percentage points lower than members whose districts are in the vicinity of DC.36 Those whose districts are at the 90th percentile (i.e., 2,200 miles), or roughly on the west coast, are predicted to have attendance rates that are 16 percentage points lower than members representing areas in the DC area.

Turning to our control variables, we find that those who leave Congress or are running for another office attend at lower rates. Based on the specification from column (2), members who will leave Congress at the end of their current term were significantly less likely to attend, with attendance rates that are 10 to 11 percentage points lower than their peers. Those who were running for another office

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during their term also attended Conference meetings at lower rates (coefficient between –4 and –5), though this difference is not statistically significant. Finally, the variable that has the strongest association with members’ attendance rates is whether they left Congress during the term, with a coefficient between –32 and –34. These findings could, of course, be driven by numerous factors, but it is consistent with a view that the value derived from caucus participation diminishes as time horizons within the institution shrink.

To examine whether these findings are driven by a particular Congress, we rerun the models from columns (2) and (6) in Table 2 for each particular Congress for which we have data. The results, displayed in Table 3, suggest that the main findings hold up within each Congress, though some of the coefficients on independent variables of interest (such as those on Party Leader and Electorally Vulnerable) are no longer statistically significant due to lower power and, sometimes, smaller coefficients. The biggest difference is seen in the coefficients on Electorally Vulnerable in the 113th Congress, which could be due to the fact that the attendance data are only from the first five months of the Congress when members may not be as attentive to or aware of their electoral vulnerability. The other inconsistent coefficients are those on the additional control variables in the model—Running for Other Office, Plans to Leave Congress, and Left Congress.

Consistent with the idea that the collective and private benefits of attendance are higher when members’ party has majority control and thus more influence on legislative outcomes, we find evidence that Republicans’ roll-call voting is a weaker (though still significant) predictor of their attendance record when their party first gains the majority in the 112th Congress (columns [5] and [6]). However, we caution interpreting too much from this for several reasons. First, members’ roll-call voting, especially as measured with party-unity scores, becomes a stronger predictor of attendance in the 113th Congress, when Republicans still had the majority. Second, the differences between the 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses are not statistically significant. And third, we only have data during one change in majority status, making it impossible to control for other changes that occurred simultaneously and may also affect the incentives to attend caucus meetings (such as an influx of inexperienced, freshmen legislators).

Overall, these findings complement and extend those from our interviews of members and their chiefs of staff. Members who vote less in line with the majority of their party and its leader in particular find less value in attending caucus meetings, suggesting that the benefits of attendance are not merely a public good valued by all
members equally. In addition, those in leadership positions and those who are electorally vulnerable (and thus need leaders’ support and are more sensitive to the party’s brand and agenda) attend more often, while those with more experience (and thus less need for information on how to vote) attend less as do those who are farther from

| TABLE 3 | A Model of House Republicans’ Caucus Meeting Attendance in Each Congress |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                      | 110th Cong. | 111th Cong. | 112th Cong. | 113th Cong. |
| DW-NOMINATE Score (.03 to 1.3) | 243.5* | 200.2* | 122.6* | 158.5* |
| DW-NOMINATE Score Squared | [77.3] | [57.9] | [42.6] | [52.5] |
| Party-Unity Score (.60 to 1) | -170.4* | -133.5* | -85.2* | -108.8* |
| Party Leader (1=yes) | 25.7* | 24.5* | 16.7 | 10.3 |
| Committee Chair or Ranking Minority (1=yes) | 14.3* | 15.9* | 17.0* | 17.8* |
| Seniority (1 to 42 yrs.) | -1.0* | -1.0* | -1.3* | -1.0* |
| Electorally Vulnerable (1=yes) | 6.9* | 7.3* | 4.4 | 8.0 |
| Distance to DC (logged) | -3.2 | -4.6* | -3.8 | -4.7* |
| Running for Other Office (1=yes) | -6.2 | -3.4 | -23.4* | -21.8* |
| Plans to Leave Congress (1=yes) | -25.8* | -23.6* | -12.1 | -13.5* |
| Left Congress (1=yes) | -53.0* | -52.0* | -61.7* | -50.4* |
| Constant | 10.6 | 12.8 | 40.4 | 47.2* |
| Observations | 203 | 203 | 180 | 238 |
| R² | 0.336 | 0.347 | 0.311 | 0.322 |

*Note: Results are from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is a member’s average caucus attendance rate in each particular Congress. Standard errors are in brackets. * p < 0.05, two-tailed.
DC (and thus have less time to devote to an additional hour-long meeting or two each week).

Conclusion

In this article, we examine the caucus meetings held by the US House Republican Party using both interviews of members and staffers as well as members’ attendance records. Though central to contemporary congressional parties’ management of their affairs, these meetings between party leadership and the rank-and-file have rarely been the focus of past scholarly work, with the exception of Forgette (2004). Specifically, we focus on the collective and private benefits afforded through caucus participation and how those benefits could influence members’ decision to attend. Our interviews of Republican House members and chiefs of staff suggest that members’ primary motivation to participate is a need for information, both from their party leaders and their Republican colleagues. They want to know the schedule and agenda and the leadership’s justification for them. They also seek cues from other members to evaluate and sometimes alter that agenda. We also find evidence that those who disagree with their party leaders value the meetings less except in instances when leadership uses the meetings to seek and respond to feedback from the membership.

Our analysis of members’ attendance records from the 110th through the beginning of the 113th Congress further supports these findings. We find that those who vote less with their party and the party leadership have lower attendance rates. Since most House Republicans vote quite similarly to one another, their roll-call behavior is not a strong predictor of their attendance. However, our regression results suggest that the most extreme decile of the party have attendance rates that are 20% lower than those who vote often with the party and similarly to Speaker Boehner. The magnitude of this effect is similar to the difference in attendance rates between those in leadership positions and the rank-and-file. Consistent with our hypotheses based on the costs and benefits of attendance, we also find that those who occupy leadership positions have higher attendance rates as do those who are electorally vulnerable. Meanwhile, more senior members and those from districts further from Washington, DC are less likely to attend.

Although the findings on the relationship between members’ roll-call voting and attendance are intuitive, it was not obvious, a priori, that members’ public voting behavior would match their private attendance behavior, or that Republicans with more moderate voting records would attend at similarly lower rates as those with more conservative ones.
Although the data do not allow us to tease out exactly which benefits motivate members’ attendance, these findings suggest that the benefits provided by party-building activities (and caucus meetings in particular) are not public goods equally valued by all members but, rather, serve the interests of members who vote most similarly to the rest of their party.

Our findings and especially our interviews and descriptive data on caucus meetings also speak to the power dynamic between the leadership and the rank-and-file. If the leadership is an agent of the party membership (Rohde 1991), we might model the meetings as a gathering of equals where the party creates its agenda and the leadership receives its orders. On the other hand, party leaders are not powerless agents. Their power stems in part from the information asymmetry between them and the rank-and-file members (Strahan 2007), which provides them considerable leverage over legislative outcomes (Curry 2015). Taken to an extreme, this could lead us to model the meetings as a place where party members receive their orders from their leaders with little recourse to defy them.

Based on our research, Republican caucus meetings fall between these two extremes. The party leadership comes to the meeting with a set agenda and strategy to persuade members to support it. Leaders use their power, especially information asymmetry, to their advantage when available and needed. Members recognize this and may find it frustrating. They express their opinions to the leadership and push back, which can affect, in their opinion, the party’s legislative agenda. There are also rare instances such as with the 2013 fiscal cliff (interviews #9, 10, and 11), in which the leadership came to their members to explicitly seek feedback and create the party’s agenda together. As Forgette (2004) and Lee (2009) argue, party organizations facilitate information exchange between party leadership and the rank-and-file, improving the party’s ability to coordinate its members’ behavior and identify their shared interests. To this, we add a caveat that this coordination and bargaining is directed from the topdown in an environment where the party leaders have some power over their members but with limits (Curry 2015), as the transition from Speaker Boehner to Speaker Ryan potentially illustrates. Interviewee #3 mentioned that “[t]here was almost no input from the Conference [under Boehner]. That’s why [he] got pushed out.” The Freedom Caucus’s opposition to Rep. McCarthy’s candidacy to the top post further illustrates this dynamic. They organized against him because of the power wielded by the Speaker. At the same time, they themselves had enough power to thwart the candidate favored by party leadership.
Future work should assess whether the findings here apply to other legislative parties and, in particular, the House Democratic Party. The staff we interviewed commented that their counterparts on the other side of the aisle faced similar dynamics as they did. On the other hand, fundamental differences in the parties’ culture (Freeman 1986; Loomis 1988; Peters 1999), ideological homogeneity (Peters 1999), emphasis on ideology or coalition groups (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016), and history with caucus meetings could carry over to other spheres, including the nature of their internal organization. Future work should also examine whether attending caucus meetings affects members’ subsequent behavior. One could examine the effect of attendance on roll-call voting, which would speak to the large literature that seeks to identify whether and how legislative parties affect members’ voting behavior. With improving content analysis tools (e.g., Grimmer and Stewart 2013) and the increasing access to electronic texts of members’ public communications, future work should also examine whether caucus attendance influences members’ messaging. These efforts to craft and control the message are a critically important yet overlooked aspect of contemporary party organizations (Lee 2013) that deserves further attention. Finally, scholars should continue to gather and analyze new sources of data on party organizations. Although analyses of members’ roll-call votes have given us leverage on many important theoretical questions, scholars should continue to seek out novel data to advance our understanding and provide new insights on the inner workings of legislative parties.

Adam M. Dynes <adamdynes@byu.edu> is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brigham Young University, 745 Kimball Tower, PO Box 25545, Provo, UT 84602. Andrew Reeves <reeves@wustl.edu> is Associate Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1063, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130.

NOTES

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the 2015 BYU Young Scholars Workshop, and the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at Brigham Young University.

1. We use the term “caucus meetings” to refer to meetings held by either the Democratic or Republican House party leadership with their respective members. The Republican caucus meetings are technically referred to as “Conference meetings” (a term we also use in this article) since the official name of their party is the House Republican Conference.

2. As one House member we interviewed noted, those who speak to reporters about what occurred in the meeting “usually have an agenda. And so what they say is often not accurate. You can’t rely on it to understand what went on.”

3. See the online appendix supporting information for more details about these interviews and interviewees.

4. Since the House usually comes into session on Monday and Tuesday evenings, the majority of meetings are held on Tuesdays and Wednesdays.

5. The party staffers who we interviewed speculated that attendance is lower at these meetings since members feel they are badgered about reaching their party fundraising goals. One of the members we interviewed stated that he or she avoids these meetings for this reason. We were able to identify the political meetings in the attendance records from 2007, 2009, and 2010 and find that attendance rates at these meetings are 5 percentage points lower—58.9% compared to the average attendance rate of 63.8% at nonpolitical meetings.

6. For example, in the lead up to the vote on January 1, 2013 to address the so-called “fiscal cliff,” the Republican Conference held an additional caucus meeting on its normal meeting day of December 18, 2012 followed by another meeting to address the issue on December 20, 2012. Using the House calendar, we can identify caucus meetings that are held outside the normal schedule. Of the 238 meetings in our records, 89 or 37% were held outside the normal schedule. The average attendance rate at these meetings was 67.6%, higher than the 63.1% attendance rate at the regularly scheduled meetings.

7. For example, an e-mail reminder prior to a meeting about the debt ceiling stated “Topic: Debt Ceiling Discussion” after the normal announcement of the time and location of the meeting.

8. We were unable to obtain agendas for the meetings to examine whether guest speakers affect attendance. Interviewees thought attendance was higher at these meetings.

9. These last two features were introduced to the meeting after Rep. McMorris Rodgers became Conference Chair. In general, her staff has attempted to enliven the beginning of meetings with music and multimedia presentations.

10. All of these are elected positions voted on by the House Republicans.

11. Party staffers mentioned that caucus meetings in the Democratic Party also have this feature, though their members get two minutes instead of just one.

12. Though Carson, Crespin, and Madonna (2012) examine e-mailed voting instructions from Democratic leaders, a senior staffer in a member’s office (interview #1) confirmed that Republican leaders also e-mail voting instructions, especially on procedural and complicated amendment votes.

13. Interview #5 reported that the whipping organization consists of dozens of members, each assigned to specific colleagues. The member mentioned that they were
once removed from the team for voting against the party’s position on a procedural vote. We were not able to obtain a list of the members of this whipping organization.

14. We conceptualize ideology as members’ preferences on legislation and policy outcomes (Lee 2009, 47), which is influenced by, among other things, members’ personal preferences and those of other electorally important groups.

15. The distribution of members’ preferences plays a central role in the power granted to the party and its ability to govern its members (Aldrich 1995). Under the cartel theory, both positive and negative agenda control are used to satisfy the preferences of the majority of the majority (Cox and McCubbins 2007, 27, 34).

16. Recall that the e-mails informing members of the meetings usually only indicate the time and location of the meeting. In special circumstances, they also indicate the primary issue that will be the focus of the meeting.

17. This could be through e-mails from the leadership with a tentative legislative schedule for the upcoming week(s) or meetings between party and members’ staff.

18. To maintain confidentiality, the gender of pronouns referring to interviewees is randomly assigned.

19. A well-documented account of such an effect is found in the 2011 debt-ceiling crisis, as Speaker Boehner repeatedly had to adjust his side of the bargain with President Obama and congressional Democrats in response to the demands of his caucus as expressed in Conference meetings and private meetings (e.g., Draper 2012).

20. We only have the records for five of 24 months in that 113th Congress. When we rerun the analyses excluding the 113th Congress or with only attendance rates from the first five months of the first year of each Congress, the results do not change substantively. (See online supporting information.) Members’ attendance in the first five months is highly correlated with their attendance for the rest of the Congress with a correlation coefficient of 0.89.

21. We agreed to keep confidential the attendance of individual House members, which places some limitations on our ability to present the data and the results of our analysis.

22. In the online supporting information, we also present results from fractional logit models that better account for the heteroscedasticity associated with dependent variables that are rates (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). The results are substantively the same, so for ease of explication, we present the results from OLS regressions here.

23. In the online supporting information, we also examine whether the independent variables have a different relationship with members’ attendance depending on the type of caucus meetings, such as the political meetings where campaign matters are discussed or meetings that are not held at the regularly scheduled time. We find that the type of caucus meeting does not significantly affect the results in Table 2.

24. We were only able to obtain attendance records from the first session of the 110th Congress (calendar year 2007)—those from the second session (calendar year 2008) were not made available.

25. As discussed earlier, these are imperfect measures of members’ policy preferences.

26. We use members’ first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores since these explain a high degree of variance in voting patterns and arguably place members on the liberal to conservative dimension (Poole and Rosenthal 2011). Furthermore, these scores
are comparable across Congresses and allow members’ ideal-point estimates to move linearly from Congress to Congress. Higher DW-NOMINATE scores are commonly interpreted as indicating a more Conservative voting behavior. In our sample of Republicans, the median DW-NOMINATE score is 0.652, the minimum is 0.107, and the maximum is 1.293.

27. As members have more seniority in the institution, they themselves are getting older, which may affect their ability to maintain a demanding schedule. Including members’ age does not affect the results presented in Tables 2 and 3.

28. We use the log rather than the absolute value to ensure that results are not driven by a few outlying districts (e.g., those in Hawaii and Alaska).

29. In the online supporting information, we also run models with these variables separated out. The coefficients all indicate that more electorally vulnerable members attend at higher rates, but they do not reach statistical significance on their own.

30. Clustering standard errors when there are few observations per cluster, as in this data set, can actually reduce standard errors. However, in this case, the standard errors are larger with clustered errors.

31. In this case, \( f(x) = 162.2x - 111x^2 \). Thus, \( f'(x) = 162.2 - 222x \). We set the derivative equal to zero and solve for \( x \).

32. This is Boehner’s average score in the 110th and 111th Congresses. As Speaker in the 112th and 113th, Boehner cast very few votes and did not have a DW-NOMINATE score.

33. We calculate that difference as \( 162.2(0.728 - 0.605) - 111(0.728^2 - 0.605^2) = 1.751 \).

34. We use his average because he did not have a score in the 112th Congress since the Speaker of the House rarely votes on legislation. This relationship holds if we measure members’ distance from Rep. Boehner’s DW-NOMINATE score in each Congress.

35. We calculate that increase as \( 83.4 \times (0.97 - 0.91) = 5 \).

36. We calculate this as \( 3.5 \times (\log(22) - \log(741)) = -12.3 \). The district closest to DC in our sample is 22 miles away from the capital.

37. We note, again, that the attendance rates are calculated based on the percent of meetings that each member attended while in office. Thus, a member who attends every Conference meeting will have an attendance rate of 100% even if she left Congress after a few weeks.

38. In the online supporting information, we present additional analyses from each Congress.

39. In the online supporting information, we plot the predicted attendance rates based on the results in Table 3. The only major difference between Congresses is that predicted attendance rates are lower in the 113th relative to the other three, but the relationship between members’ roll-call voting and attendance is substantively the same.

40. We acknowledge that the vast majority of members vote similarly to their colleagues and party leaders and attend at similar rates to one another, all else equal.
REFERENCES


Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:

Information about Interviews; Bivariate Relationship Between Independent Variables and Attendance; Results by Congress; Results with Attendance Rates at Different Types of Caucus Meetings; Results Excluding 113th Congress; Results Limited to First Five Months of Each Congress; Fractional Logit Models; Results with Additional Independent Variables